4 The Two Boundaries of Naming

4.1 General Names and Particular Names

4.1.1 Extending and Combining Until There Is Nothing Left to Combine

The seventh section discusses the hierarchy of names: "Though the myriad things are many, there are times when one wishes to refer to them all at once, and so they are called 'things' (wu); 'thing' is the great general name. Extend it and combine it further, and combination will always yield further combination, until one reaches the point where there is nothing left to combine, and there it stops. There are times when one wishes to refer to them comprehensively yet by kind, and so they are called 'birds and beasts.' 'Birds and beasts' is the great particular name. Extend it and divide it further, and division will always yield further division, until one reaches the point where there is nothing left to divide, and there it stops."

This passage traces out a tree. Moving upward is "combining": gathering many different things under a single name. Ox and horse combine as "beast"; beast and bird combine as "birds and beasts"; birds and beasts, together with grasses and trees, combine as "living things"; and finally everything combines as "thing" (wu). "Thing" is the greatest general name—beyond it there is nothing left to combine, and "there it stops."

Moving downward is "dividing": separating out what lies under a single name. "Thing" divides into the living and the non-living; the living divides into animal and plant; animal divides into bird and beast; beast divides into ox and horse; ox further divides into yellow ox and black ox; black ox further divides into this one and that one, until division can go no further, and "there it stops."

This tree has two endpoints. The upper endpoint is "thing"; the lower endpoint is "a single actuality"—the very thing described in the ninth section as "having transformation but no division." A name operates somewhere between these two endpoints.

4.1.2 The Particular, the Combined, and the General

The sixth section discusses the concrete operation of naming: "If a single term suffices to make the meaning clear, use a single term; if a single term does not suffice, use a combined term. If a particular name and a combined name do not obstruct one another, they may be used together; even used together, there is no harm in it."

If one word can make the meaning clear, use one word—for example, "horse." If one word cannot make it clear, use two words—for example, "white horse." If a particular name and a combined name do not interfere with each other, they can be used side by side; "horse" and "white horse" can both exist at once without harm.

These lines look like they are discussing economy of word choice, but in fact they are discussing how names at different levels of the same tree can coexist. "Horse" is a general name, "white horse" is a particular name, and the two do not conflict, because a white horse is, to begin with, a kind of horse. Master Xun does not name names here, but he is plainly addressing claims of the "a white horse is not a horse" variety. He does not argue with them—he simply states calmly: a particular name and a combined name do not obstruct one another, and using them together does no harm. That a white horse is a horse is a matter of convention, and within the convention there is no conflict, so there is no need to manufacture one.

"To know that different actualities have different names, so that different actualities never fail to have different names—this must not be thrown into disorder—just as one must make sure that identical actualities never fail to share the same name." Different actualities take different names; identical actualities take the same name—this is the whole of the rule. The rule is extremely simple; what is difficult is holding to it.

4.1.3 The Meaning of the Tree

The significance of this tree is that it places the myriad things within an order that can be traversed from top to bottom and from bottom to top. Any actuality can find its place on this tree: which general name it belongs to, which particular name it is, what lies above it, what lies below it. The fourth section says the function of instituting names is "above, to make clear the noble and the base; below, to distinguish the same from the different"—this tree is the map of sameness and difference.

The "Great Treatise" of the Book of Changes says: "Things gather according to their tendencies; creatures divide into their groups." Gathering by tendency and dividing into groups is precisely combining and dividing. It also says: "Draw it out and extend it, touch upon a category and expand it, and the capable work of the realm is complete." To touch upon a category and expand it is to move along this tree, upward and downward. What Master Xun calls "extending it and combining it further" and "extending it and dividing it further" is the very same thing as the "Great Treatise's" "drawing it out and extending it" and "touching upon a category and expanding it."

4.2 Two Points Where Things "Stop"

4.2.1 "Thing" Is the Apex of Names

"Until one reaches the point where there is nothing left to combine, and there it stops"—this word "stops" matters. Names are extended upward, and when extended to "thing," they stop. Why stop$22 Because there is nothing further up that can be combined with anything else. "Thing" already includes everything that can be named.

But there is a question here: what of the Way$23 The Way is not a thing. Does the Way stand above "thing," or outside it entirely$24 Master Xun does not place the Way on this tree. In the eleventh section he says, "the Way is the guiding principle of governance," and "the mind accords with the Way"—the Way is what the mind accords with, not what a name points to. The tree of names stops at "thing"; the Way is not on the tree.

This arrangement is not an oversight—it is a matter of proportion. What a name can point to is an actuality that has form and shape, something that can be perceived by the Heavenly Faculties. The Way has no form or shape; the Heavenly Faculties cannot perceive it, and so a name cannot point to it. Names stop at "thing," and in this stopping, the boundary of names is being acknowledged.

4.2.2 The Most High's "Knowing When to Stop"

Chapter 32 of the Daodejing by the Most High (Laozi) says: "Once institutions began, there were names; once names existed, one must know when to stop; knowing when to stop, one can avoid danger." Once institutions began, names came into being; once names existed, one had to know when to stop; knowing when to stop, one could be free of danger.

Read alongside Master Xun's "there it stops, once there is nothing left to combine," this line yields an unexpected resonance. The Most High says names must know when to stop; Master Xun says names, extended, stop at "thing." The Most High's "stopping" is a caution against names: once a name exists, a person is easily carried along by it, going further and further, forgetting that beyond names there is the Way—hence one must know when to stop. Master Xun's "stopping" is a definition of names: names, extended to their greatest general name, come to an end, and beyond that point names cannot reach.

The two "stoppings" draw the very same line—one speaks of it from the vantage of the Way, the other from the vantage of names. The Most High stands on that side of the line and says the names on this side must not cross over; Master Xun stands on this side of the line and says names stop right here. It is one and the same line.

Chapter 1 of the Daodejing also says: "The nameless is the beginning of Heaven and Earth; the named is the mother of the myriad things." The nameless is the beginning of Heaven and Earth; the named is the mother of the myriad things. The myriad things are differentiated through being named, while Heaven and Earth remain within namelessness. This corresponds exactly with Master Xun's "'thing' is the great general name": "thing" is the apex of what can be named, and above "thing" lies the nameless. Master Xun's "thing" is precisely the highest point that the Most High's "named" can reach.

4.2.3 A Single Actuality Is the Base Point of Names

Downward, the "stopping" is "until one reaches the point where there is nothing left to divide, and there it stops." Names divide downward, and when divided down to a single, indivisible actuality, they stop. Why stop$25 Because there is nothing further down that can be divided from anything else. This particular black ox is this particular black ox; it cannot be further divided into two things.

There is a matter of proportion here as well. Names can divide downward as far as a single actuality, but no further. Attempts to draw further distinctions within a single actuality—claims of the kind "today's me is not yesterday's me"—are addressed by Master Xun in the ninth section through the concept of "transformation": "When the state changes but the actuality has undergone no division, and yet it is treated as different, this is called transformation. Where there is transformation but no division, this is called a single actuality." The state has changed, but the actuality has not—this is called transformation; where there has been change but no division, it remains a single actuality. The base point of names is a single actuality, and transformation cannot turn a single actuality into two.

So the tree of names has two boundaries, upper and lower. The upper limit is "thing"; above "thing" is the Way, which names cannot reach. The lower limit is a single actuality; within a single actuality is transformation, which names no longer divide. Between these two boundaries, names can freely extend, combining and dividing. These two boundaries are not defects of names—they are the proper measure of names. A name knows what it can do and what it cannot.

4.3 The Chain from the Way to Names

4.3.1 The Mind Accords with the Way, Explanation Accords with the Mind, Statements Accord with Explanation

The eleventh section has a line that strings together the Way, the mind, explanation, and statement: "The mind accords with the Way, explanation accords with the mind, statements accord with explanation."

This is a downward chain. At the very top is the Way; the mind must accord with the Way. Then comes explanation; explanation must accord with the mind. Then comes statement; statement must accord with explanation. Below statement there is still name, because "a statement is what combines the names of different actualities in order to discuss a single meaning"—a statement is composed of names. So the full chain is: Way, mind, explanation, statement, name.

Name is the terminus of this chain, the furthest-reaching manifestation of the Way. The Way itself has no name, but for the Way to move through the realm, it must pass through mind, explanation, and statement, and finally come to rest in name. A name is the footprint the Way leaves as it walks through the realm. The footprint is not the foot, but without the footprint, no one could know which way the foot has gone.

This chain can also be read in reverse. Tracing back from name: names form statements, statements form explanations, explanations issue from the mind, the mind accords with the Way. The eleventh section continues: "Rectifying names in order to agree upon them, making the substance clear in order to convey it, distinguishing differences without overstepping, extending categories without contradiction." Rectifying names is the starting point; extending categories is the endpoint. Starting from name and pushing all the way through, one can arrive at the Way. So although name is the terminus, it is also the entry point.

4.3.2 What Is Above Form Is Called the Way; What Is Below Form Is Called an Instrument

The "Great Treatise" of the Book of Changes says: "What is above form is called the Way; what is below form is called an instrument (qi)." The Way stands above form; the instrument stands below form. Which side does a name belong to$26 What a name points to is an actuality, and an actuality has form; a name is established following the actuality. So a name belongs on the side of the instrument.

Master Xun's chain corresponds exactly to this division. The Way stands at the very top, above form; name stands at the very bottom, below form. The mind, explanation, and statement in between are the steps of the stair descending from what is above form to what is below form. The mind is closest to the Way—"the mind accords with the Way"; name is furthest from the Way—a name merely points to an actuality.

But the "Great Treatise" does not disdain the instrument simply because it lies below form. It continues: "To transform it and cut it to shape is called change; to extend it and carry it out is called penetration; to take it up and set it in place for all the people of the realm is called an enterprise." For the Way to be transformed, cut to shape, extended, carried out, and set in place throughout the realm, culminating in an enterprise, none of this can dispense with the instrument. In the same way, Master Xun does not disdain name simply because it is the terminus of the chain. He says, "agreement, designation, disputation, and explanation are the great pattern of use, and the beginning of kingly enterprise." Name is the beginning of kingly enterprise. For the Way to move through the realm, it must come to rest in name.

4.3.3 The Proportion Between Name and the Way

Drawing together the meaning of this chapter, one can say: Master Xun has a very clear positioning for names. Names are conventional, not innate; names point to actualities, not to the Way; names have an upper limit and a lower limit, the upper limit being "thing" and the lower limit being "a single actuality"; name stands at the terminus of the chain running Way, mind, explanation, statement, name—it is the Way's furthest-reaching manifestation, and also the entry point leading toward the Way.

This positioning is not, as is commonly assumed, opposed to the views of the Most High and Master Zhuang. The Most High says a nameable name is not the constant name, yet Master Xun never asks a name to point to the Way either. Master Zhuang says a thing comes to be so by being called so, yet Master Xun likewise acknowledges that names have no fixed appropriateness. The difference among the three lies not in their understanding of names, but in how they use names: the Daoists, because names are limited, use names sparingly; Master Xun, because names are limited, all the more insists on using names where they can be used, and using them well.

This, too, is a consistent distinction between Confucianism and Daoism. Seeing the limit, Daoism stops short of it; seeing the limit, Confucianism exerts itself fully within it. Both are a form of respect for the limit—only the manner of respecting it differs.