6 The Three Delusions and the Inevitability of Disputation

6.1 Re-Reading the Three Delusions

6.1.1 "Being Insulted Is Not Disgraceful"

The first delusion in the tenth section consists of "being insulted is not disgraceful," "the sage does not love himself," and "killing a robber is not killing a man"; Master Xun calls this "delusion arising from using names to throw names into disorder." These three claims come from different schools, and Master Xun does not sort them out individually—he simply points out that they all commit the same error.

Take "being insulted is not disgraceful" as an example. Master Xun offers a detailed analysis in the "Correct Discussions" (Zheng Lun) chapter. He divides both honor and disgrace into two kinds: "there is honor of righteousness and honor of power; there is disgrace of righteousness and disgrace of power." Honor of righteousness is honor attained through cultivated intent and deep virtuous conduct; honor of power is honor attained through high rank and rich emolument. Disgrace of righteousness is disgrace incurred through dissolute and corrupt conduct; disgrace of power is disgrace suffered through being insulted or physically assaulted. The noble person may suffer disgrace of power without suffering disgrace of righteousness; the petty person may enjoy honor of power without enjoying honor of righteousness.

Return now to "being insulted is not disgraceful." This statement means that suffering an insult does not count as disgrace. Master Xun points out where it goes wrong: the name "disgrace" in fact contains two actualities, disgrace of righteousness and disgrace of power. Being insulted is disgrace of power, not disgrace of righteousness. Whoever says "being insulted is not disgraceful" is using "it is not disgrace of righteousness" to deny "it is disgrace of power," mixing two actualities into a single name and using one half of a name to deny the other half. This is "using names to throw names into disorder."

The method of testing it is to "test it by why there are names, and observe which reading holds." What are names for$10 For distinguishing sameness and difference. Disgrace of righteousness and disgrace of power are two actualities, and so they ought to be distinguished, not conflated. To conflate them is to violate the very purpose of having names.

6.1.2 "Mountain and Abyss Are Level" and "The Emotions Desire Little"

The second delusion consists of "mountain and abyss are level," "the emotions desire little," and "fed meats add no sweetness, great bells add no delight"; Master Xun calls this "delusion arising from using actualities to throw names into disorder."

"Mountain and abyss are level" claims that a mountain and an abyss are equally level. From some special vantage—say, regarding both the mountaintop and the abyss-bottom as parts of the earth's surface—this statement can carry a certain sense. But the two names "mountain" and "abyss" are distinguished on the basis of the Heavenly Faculties: the eye sees the mountain as high and the abyss as low. To use some special actuality (seen, say, from an extreme distance, or arrived at through some manner of speculation) to alter the ordinary meaning of a name is precisely "using actuality to throw names into disorder."

The method of testing it is to "test it by there being nothing to rely on for sameness and difference, and observe which position harmonizes with the facts." On what basis is sameness and difference distinguished$11 On the basis of the Heavenly Faculties. The sameness and difference distinguished by the Heavenly Faculties is the same for everyone—it "harmonizes," it is consistent. An actuality seen from a special vantage that does not harmonize with the sameness and difference distinguished by the Heavenly Faculties cannot be used to alter a name.

"The emotions desire little" is the same. It claims that human emotion is inherently one of few desires. Master Xun's method of testing it is to check it against the Heavenly Faculties. Do people in fact desire little$12 "That men desire life is extreme indeed, that men hate death is extreme indeed"—people's desires are many; this is the actual condition registered by the Heavenly Faculties. "The emotions desire little" uses some special actuality (perhaps the sage's emotional state, perhaps some idealized emotional state) to alter the ordinary meaning of the name "emotion."

6.1.3 "There Being Ox-and-Horse Is Not the Same as There Being a Horse"

The third delusion consists of "to deny, yet appeal to the pillar" and "there being ox-and-horse is not the same as there being a horse"; Master Xun calls this "delusion arising from using names to throw actualities into disorder."

"There being ox-and-horse is not the same as there being a horse" claims that the combined name "ox-and-horse" is not equivalent to the particular name "horse," and so ox-and-horse is not horse. At the level of names, this has a certain plausibility: a combined name and a particular name really are different. But Master Xun points out that this uses the combining and separating of names to deny the existence of an actuality. Among ox-and-horse, there plainly is a horse—how can one say that ox-and-horse is not horse$13

The method of testing it is to "test it by the conventions of names, using what has been accepted to contradict what is being claimed." How was the name conventionally agreed upon$14 Once it is agreed that "ox-and-horse" is the combined designation for ox and horse together, one must accept that among ox-and-horse there is a horse. Whoever says "there being ox-and-horse is not the same as there being a horse" accepts, on the one hand, the convention behind the combined name "ox-and-horse," while, on the other hand, rejecting what that very convention entails—a self-contradiction.

Reading through the three delusions, one finds that Master Xun's method for handling them is never to argue with them directly, but to measure them against a rod. The first rod is the purpose of names; the second is the sameness and difference given by the Heavenly Faculties; the third is the convention of names. These three rods are the very ones built up in sections three through nine, and are taken up for use in the tenth. Master Xun does not dispute with heterodox claims—he simply lays them against the rod and measures them, and then says, "one is able to prohibit them."

6.2 The Enlightened Ruler Does Not Engage in Disputation

6.2.1 The People Are Easily Unified by the Way, but Cannot Be Made to Share in Its Rationale

The eleventh section opens by saying: "All heterodox claims and deviant sayings that depart from the correct Way and are arbitrarily contrived belong, without exception, to one of the three delusions. Hence the enlightened ruler, knowing their category, does not engage them in disputation. For the people can easily be unified through the Way, but cannot be made to share in its rationale."

Every heterodox claim falls into one of the three delusions. So the enlightened ruler, knowing which category a claim belongs to, does not go and dispute with it. Why not dispute$15 Because "the people can easily be unified through the Way, but cannot be made to share in its rationale." The common people can readily be unified by following the Way, but it is difficult to get them all to grasp, together, the reasons behind it.

This is close in meaning to the Analects' "Tai Bo" chapter: "The people may be made to follow it, but may not be made to understand it." The people can be led to walk the Way, but it is hard to make them all understand the reasons for it. This is not a matter of holding the people in contempt—it is a realistic recognition about governance: governing the realm cannot rely on explaining every principle to every single person; it can only rely on establishing an order that everyone can follow.

So the enlightened ruler's method is: "to oversee them with authority, to guide them with the Way, to make things clear to them through decree, to illuminate through discourse, and to prohibit through punishment." Overseeing with authority, guiding with the Way, clarifying with decree, illuminating with discourse, prohibiting with punishment. Of these five means, discourse is only one, and it comes after decree.

6.2.2 What Use Is Disputation$16

"Hence when the people are transformed by the Way, it is as swift as if by a spirit—what use, then, is disputation!" Once the people have been transformed by the Way, it happens as swiftly as if by a spirit—what further use is there for disputation$17

This sentence places disputation in a very low position. In a realm governed by an enlightened ruler, disputation is unnecessary. The people follow the Way, strange expressions have no occasion to arise, and so there is nothing to dispute about. Disputation is not a normal instrument of governance—it is a remedy resorted to only after governance has already failed.

This view is not unique to Master Xun within Confucianism. The Master says, "I wish to say nothing" (Analects, "Yang Huo"), and, "What does Heaven ever say$18 The four seasons proceed, the hundred things are born—what does Heaven ever say$19" Heaven says nothing, yet the four seasons proceed; the sage's transforming influence ought likewise to work not through disputation but through action. Master Meng, though fond of disputation, still says, "How could I delight in disputation$20 I have no choice" ("Teng Wen Gong II"). Disputation is something one resorts to only when there is no other choice.

6.2.3 The Sage Kings Gone, and So There Is Disputation

"Now that the sage kings are gone, the realm is in disorder, heterodox sayings have arisen, the noble person has no authority with which to oversee them and no punishment with which to prohibit them, and so there is disputation." Now the sage kings are gone, the realm is in disorder, heterodox sayings have arisen, the noble person has no authority to oversee them with and no punishment to prohibit them with, and so he has no choice but to engage in disputation.

This sentence is startlingly candid. Master Xun himself was a man of disputation—both the "Against the Twelve Masters" (Fei Shi Er Zi) and the Rectification of Names are works of disputation. But he does not take pride in disputation. He says disputation is the choice made only after "the noble person has no authority with which to oversee them and no punishment with which to prohibit them." If the noble person had authority and punishment at his disposal, disputation would not be necessary.

This is the very same sentiment as Master Meng's "How could I delight in disputation$21 I have no choice." Both Confucians engaged in disputation, and neither took pleasure in it. Disputation belongs to a degenerate age—it is the expedient of a time when the sage kings are absent.

6.3 Disputation as a Last Resort

6.3.1 The Ladder of Agreement, Designation, Explanation, and Disputation

The eleventh section goes on to give a ladder: "When the actuality itself does not make itself understood, only then does one designate it; when designation does not make it understood, only then does one agree upon its usage; when agreement does not make it understood, only then does one explain it; when explanation does not make it understood, only then does one dispute it." When an actuality cannot by itself make itself understood, one gives it a name; when naming still fails to make it understood, one agrees upon its usage; when agreement still fails, one offers an explanation; when explanation still fails, one disputes.

This ladder begins with actuality, passes through designation and agreement and explanation, and arrives finally at disputation. Each rung is climbed only because the one below has proven insufficient. Disputation is the last rung, resorted to only after every preceding means has proven insufficient.

This ladder places disputation in an entirely unambiguous position: it is the last resort, not the first choice. The most ideal condition is for "the actuality to make itself understood," for the actuality itself to make itself clear to people without anything needing to be said at all. Next best is naming; next after that, agreement; next, explanation; and lowest of all, disputation. Master Xun's attitude toward disputation is laid bare entirely by this ladder.

6.3.2 "One Who Is Good Does Not Dispute; Great Disputation Uses No Words"

The Daoist attitude toward disputation is even more resolute than the Confucian one. The Most High says: "One who is good does not dispute; one who disputes is not good" (Daodejing, chapter 81). A good person does not dispute; one who disputes is not good. He also says: "Much speech leads repeatedly to exhaustion; better to hold to the center" (chapter 5). Speaking too much only brings one to a dead end—better to hold to the middle course.

Master Zhuang says in the "Discourse on Making All Things Equal": "The great Way is not named; great disputation uses no words." The great Way needs no designation; great disputation needs no speech. He also says: "Where there is disputation, there is something not seen." Disputation itself is proof that something remains unseen. One who truly sees has no need to dispute.

Confucianism and Daoism agree on this point. The Master's "I wish to say nothing," Master Meng's "I have no choice," Master Xun's "what use is disputation," the Most High's "one who is good does not dispute," Master Zhuang's "great disputation uses no words"—all of these say the very same thing: disputation is not the highest state; disputation is a remedy resorted to only when there is no other choice. The only difference is this: the Daoists, for this reason, dispute little or not at all, while the Confucians, though disputing only when they have no choice, still dispute.

What is distinctive about Master Xun is that he turns this "no other choice" into a ladder. He neither rejects disputation outright nor exalts it unconditionally—instead, he places it on the lowest rung of a ladder and states clearly when it is necessary and when it is superfluous. This is an extremely clear-eyed attitude.

6.3.3 When the Explanation Is Adopted, the Realm Is Set Right; When It Is Not, One Makes the Way Plain and Withdraws into Obscurity

The end of the eleventh section discusses the disputation of the sage: "When the explanation is adopted, the realm is set right; when the explanation is not adopted, one makes the Way plain and withdraws into obscurity and hardship." When the disputation is accepted, the realm is set right; when it is not accepted, one makes the Way plain and clear, and then withdraws into obscurity and hardship.

This sentence accounts for the disputant's own circumstances. Disputation is not guaranteed to be accepted. What then, if it is not accepted$22 One "makes the Way plain and withdraws into obscurity"—one states the Way clearly, and then accepts the outcome of not being accepted. Without resentment, without changing course, without flattery.

This is the same attitude the Master expressed to Master Yan (Yan Hui): "Employed, I act; set aside, I withdraw into obscurity—only you and I are capable of this" (Analects, "Shu Er"). If employed, I carry out the Way; if not employed, I withdraw. The "Commentary on the Words" (Wenyan) to the Qian hexagram of the Book of Changes says: "Withdrawing from the world causes no distress; not being approved of causes no distress." Withdrawing into reclusion causes no distress; not being recognized by others causes no distress. Master Xun's "obscurity and hardship" is this same "withdrawal from the world," and his "making the Way plain" is this same speaking of what is right even while "not being approved of."

The hardest thing for a disputant is not the disputing itself, but disputing and then not being heeded. With the five words "makes the Way plain and withdraws into obscurity," Master Xun gives the disputant a place to stand: your responsibility is to state the Way plainly; whether the Way is carried out or not is not something you can determine. Once you have stated it plainly, your responsibility is discharged. This turns disputation from a contest to be won into a duty to be fulfilled. One disputes not in order to win, but in order to state the Way clearly. Once it is stated clearly, winning or losing no longer matters. This is the distinction between the disputation of the sage and the disputation of ordinary people.