3 Names Have No Fixed Appropriateness, and Names Have a Fixed Goodness

3.1 Names Arise from Convention

3.1.1 What Convention Establishes as Custom Is Called Appropriate

The eighth section is the most concentrated statement in the whole essay on the nature of names: "Names have no fixed appropriateness; they are agreed upon in order to designate; once the convention is settled and has become custom, it is called appropriate; what differs from the convention is called inappropriate. Names have no fixed actuality; they are agreed upon in order to designate an actuality; once the convention is settled and has become custom, it is called the name for that actuality. Names do have a fixed goodness: what is direct and easy and does not go against the ear or the mind is called a good name."

The first two statements say the same thing: between name and actuality there is no natural, fixed correspondence. Why is this animal called ox rather than horse$15 There is no reason—it is simply convention. Once agreed upon, and once everyone uses it this way and it becomes habitual, it is "appropriate," it is fitting; what differs from the convention is "inappropriate." The relationship between name and actuality is agreed upon by people; it is not innate.

Stated plainly, this sounds unremarkable, yet in the pre-Qin period it was a bold stance. It means that a name in itself carries no sacredness whatsoever. A name is a tool, and the goodness of a tool lies in how smoothly it can be used, not in any mysterious origin it might have. Master Xun's use of the word "convention" (yue) to describe names follows the same line of thought as his use of the word "artifice" (wei) to describe ritual propriety: ritual propriety is instituted by the sages, names are agreed upon by the multitude, and both are human artifice, not something sent down from Heaven.

3.1.2 Things Are So Because They Are Called So

Master Zhuang says something almost identical in the "Discourse on Making All Things Equal" (Qiwulun): "The Way comes to be by being walked; a thing comes to be so by being called so. Why is it so$16 It is so because it is affirmed as so. Why is it not so$17 It is not so because it is denied as so." A road is walked into being by people; a thing is called into being by people. Why is it so$18 Because everyone says it is so. Why is it not so$19 Because everyone says it is not so.

"A thing comes to be so by being called so" and "what convention establishes as custom is called appropriate" are two expressions of a single insight. Master Zhuang saw the conventionality of names, and so did Master Xun. Neither man believed that names fall from the sky; both held that names are imposed by people upon things. On this level, Confucianism and Daoism have no disagreement about the nature of names.

But starting from this shared premise, the two men move in opposite directions.

3.1.3 Equalizing Right and Wrong versus Unifying the People

What Master Zhuang derives from "a thing comes to be so by being called so" is this: since names are what people call things, then each side's sense of right and wrong is likewise what people call it—"this too is one 'right,' one 'wrong'; that too is one 'right,' one 'wrong'"—and therefore one need not cling stubbornly to any single side's names and judgments of right and wrong. One should "harmonize them with the Heavenly Equalizer," "rest in the Heavenly Wheel," letting the various positions each settle into its own place without overriding one another. For Master Zhuang, the conventionality of names becomes a reason to dissolve names. Since names are conventional, one need not take them too seriously.

What Master Xun derives from "what convention establishes as custom is called appropriate" is the opposite: since names are conventional, the convention must have someone to guard it; the guardian of the convention is the true king—"when the true king institutes names, once names are fixed, actualities are distinguished"—and whoever destroys the convention is a "great villain," "his crime on a par with the crime of forging tallies and tampering with weights and measures." For Master Xun, the conventionality of names becomes a reason to take firm hold of names. Since names are conventional, one must all the more earnestly guard the convention, because nothing else stands behind it to back it up.

This is a most interesting fork in the road. Both men equally acknowledge that names are of human making, yet one says "therefore there is no need to cling to them," and the other says "therefore they must be strictly guarded." The difference lies not in their understanding of names but in what they expect of people. Master Zhuang expects a person to be able to look past names toward the Way; Master Xun expects a person to be able to rely on names in order to carry out the Way. Master Zhuang, seeing the relativity of names, counsels people to let go; Master Xun, seeing the same relativity, counsels people to hold firm.

These two attitudes need not be incompatible. In disputation, a person needs Master Xun's strict guarding; in solitude, a person needs Master Zhuang's letting go. Master Xun himself, in the "Dispelling Obscuration" (Jie Bi) chapter, also speaks of "emptiness, unity, and stillness," saying that the mind must be able to become empty in order to accommodate new knowledge—which has something in common with Master Zhuang's "fasting of the mind." It is only that the Rectification of Names, being written for the true king, speaks solely of strict guarding, and not of letting go.

3.2 Names Have a Fixed Goodness

3.2.1 The Asymmetry Between Appropriateness and Goodness

There is a subtlety in the eighth section that is often overlooked: the first two statements say "names have no fixed appropriateness" and "names have no fixed actuality," while the third statement says "names have a fixed goodness." Appropriateness has nothing fixed; actuality has nothing fixed; but goodness does have something fixed.

This asymmetry is deliberate. Master Xun does not hold that names are entirely arbitrary. The correspondence between name and actuality is a matter of convention, but among the many possible conventions, some are good and some are not. The standard of goodness is "direct and easy, not going against the ear or mind": straightforward, easy, not awkward. A name that people understand the instant it is spoken, that does not conflict with other names in use, that requires no laborious explanation—that is a good name. Conversely, a name that is roundabout, easily confused, and awkward in use is not a good name.

That is to say, the conventionality of names does not amount to the arbitrariness of names. Conventions have their better and worse forms, and the standard for better or worse does not come from convention itself but from the function of names: names exist in order to "point to actualities" and "make intentions understood," and a name that points to actuality and makes intentions understood smoothly is a good name.

3.2.2 Goodness Within Artifice

This layer of meaning follows the same line of reasoning as Master Xun's account of nature and artifice. The "Human Nature Is Bad" chapter says: "Ritual propriety and righteousness are what the sages have produced." Ritual propriety and righteousness are instituted by the sages—they are artifice, not nature. But Master Xun never argues that, because ritual propriety and righteousness are artifice, they may therefore be instituted arbitrarily. On the contrary, ritual propriety and righteousness have extremely strict rational grounds; the "Discourse on Ritual" (Li Lun) chapter says that ritual propriety "above serves Heaven, below serves Earth, honors one's ancestors, and exalts one's ruler and teachers"—every clause and pattern of ritual has its own rationale.

So it is with names. Names are artifice, something that "comes to completion only after deliberation has accumulated and capacity has been practiced." But within artifice there is good and not-good, just as ritual propriety has its gains and its losses. With the statement "names have a fixed goodness," Master Xun pulls names back one step from pure convention: a conventional name is still subject to judgment as good or not good. The basis of this judgment is whether the name can smoothly accomplish its function.

From this one can see a basic pattern in Master Xun's thought: what is of human making does not, simply by being of human making, lose its standard. The standard resides within human artifice itself, not outside it. Heaven does not supply the standard, but in the course of doing, people discover which way of doing is smoother, more communicative, less contrary. This is goodness.

3.2.3 Direct and Easy, Not Going Against

The phrase "direct and easy, not going against" is also worth pausing over. Direct (jing) means straightforward; easy (yi) means unforced; not going against (bu fu) means not contrary. These three words describe the relationship between name and mind. A good name is one the mind understands the moment it hears it, one the mind can use without getting tangled. The goodness of a name is, in the end, judged by the mind.

This carries the question of names over to the mind. The eleventh section says, "the mind is the artisan-steward of the Way"; the fifth section says, "the mind has verifying cognition." Names must be received, used, and judged by the mind. Whether a name is direct and easy and does not go against is not something the name itself can determine—it is something the mind feels in the course of using it. In discussing names, Master Xun never once departs from the mind.

3.3 The Boundaries of Convention

3.3.1 Who Does the Agreeing

Since names are conventional, a question arises: who has the standing to make the convention$20 The third section gives a clear answer: "the true king institutes names." Not just anyone may institute names. Yet the true king does not institute names out of nothing either—he must "follow the old names, and create new ones," adding onto the foundation of an already-established convention.

What, then, is the place of the ordinary person$21 To guard the convention. "Among his people none will dare to fabricate strange expressions in order to throw the rectification of names into disorder." The people do not institute names, but the people guard names. This is not suppression—it is a division of labor. A name is a public scale; the scale is calibrated by the court, and used by the common people. If every commoner were free to privately alter the scale, the scale would lose its meaning.

This division of labor echoes the Master's saying, "when the noble person names something, it must be sayable; when he says something, it must be doable." The noble person, in naming, must make the name something that can be said through to its conclusion, something that can be carried out. Naming is a responsibility, not a right. The true king's power to institute names derives from the responsibility he bears for the name's coherence and its being carried into practice.

3.3.2 Convention Is Not Arbitrary

A conventional name is still subject to "verification against actuality." This is the first boundary of convention: a name may be agreed upon, but once agreed upon it must be checkable against actuality. If a convention cannot be verified—for example, the claim "mountain and abyss are level"—one might, from some extreme point of view, call a mountain and an abyss level, but checked against the Heavenly Faculties, the mountain is high and the abyss is low, visible to everyone; such a convention is invalid.

The second boundary of convention is that it must not conflict with existing conventions. The sixth section says, "when a particular name and a combined name do not obstruct one another, they may be used together." If a particular name and a combined name do not interfere with each other, they can share use. Conversely, if a new name conflicts with an old one, causing people "confusion," causing people "much contentious argument," this new name is a "strange expression," and ought to be prohibited.

The third boundary of convention is goodness. Among possible conventions, one takes what is direct and easy and does not go against. Master Xun does not give a full procedure for selecting good names, but he does give a standard. Where there is a standard, there is no arbitrariness.

3.3.3 A Comparison with the Most High (Laozi)

The Most High says: "The Way that can be spoken of is not the constant Way; the name that can be named is not the constant name." A Way that can be put into words is not the constant Way; a name that can be given is not the constant name. The Most High's attitude toward names is even more cautious than Master Zhuang's. He does not say that names can be set aside—he says that names simply cannot reach the Way at all.

Master Xun does not deny this. The whole of the Rectification of Names discusses how "names" point to "actualities"; nowhere does it say that names can point to the "Way." The eleventh section says, "the mind accords with the Way, explanation accords with the mind, and statements accord with explanation"—the Way stands above the mind, and names stand below statements. Between name and Way lie three intervening layers: statement, explanation, and mind. What a name can do is let each actuality return to its proper place; the Way is what the mind accords with, not what a name points to.

So there is no fundamental conflict between Master Xun and the Most High on the relationship between name and Way. The Most High says names cannot reach the Way, and Master Xun never asks names to reach the Way either. The difference between the two is this: because the Most High held that names cannot reach the Way, he said very little about names; Master Xun, though he too knew that names cannot reach the Way, still had to make names clear, because governing the realm requires names. This is the distinction between the sage and the true king, the distinction between the Daoist retreat and the Confucian advance—not a distinction between right and wrong.