An In-depth Interpretation of Mencius' 'The Trees of Ox Mountain' Chapter: The Core of Innate Goodness and Cultivation of Mind and Nature

Chapter 5: "When people see it barren and assume there was never any timber, is this the nature of the mountain$50" — Errors in Cognition and Discernment of Nature

Section 5.1 "Assuming there was never any timber": The Fallacy of Inferring Nature from Results

This line points to a crucial turning point in the chapter’s argument. Mencius highlights a very common cognitive error: people see the barren state of Ox Mountain and conclude, "this mountain never grew good trees."

What is the essence of this cognitive error$51 It is to deduce the "original nature" (cause) from the "current state" (result), while ignoring the "process" (external intervention and change). People see only the result of "barrenness" but fail to ask "Why did it become barren$52"—was it due to the cutting of axes and adzes and the grazing of cattle and sheep, or because the mountain itself cannot grow trees$53

This error is extremely common in daily life. People see a person acting wickedly and conclude that this person is "naturally cruel" or "never had a conscience to begin with." People see a nation lagging behind and conclude that this nation is "inherently dull" or "lacks the genes for civilization." These are all fallacies of "assuming there was never any timber"—deducing nature from results while ignoring the process that led to those results.

Mencius’s profundity lies in not only pointing out this error but also revealing its danger. If people truly believe that "the mountain was never naturally wooded," then no one will bother planting trees—since it naturally doesn't grow trees, planting them is futile. Similarly, if people truly believe that "human nature is inherently without goodness," then no one will bother with moral instruction or cultivation—since nature is not good, teaching is futile. The danger of this belief is that it negates the necessity and possibility of moral cultivation.

Hence, Mencius shatters this misconception with a sharp rhetorical question: "Is this the nature of the mountain$54" (Ci qi shan zhi xing ye zai$55) Of course not! The nature of the mountain is to be "once luxuriant" (chang mei), capable of growing dense forests. Barrenness is merely the result of external harm, not the mountain's true nature.

Section 5.2 Discernment of the Term "Nature" (Xing)

The character "Xing" (Nature) is the core concept of this chapter and indeed of pre-Qin theories of human nature. Mencius uses the "nature of the mountain" (shan zhi xing) here to lead into the discussion of "human nature" (ren zhi xing), a move deeply consistent with the meaning of "What Heaven imparts is called Nature" in the Doctrine of the Mean.

In pre-Qin literature, the meaning of "Xing" underwent a rich evolution:

I. The Book of Documents (Zhao Gao): "Regulate nature (jie xing), only day by day advance." Early annotations before Zhao Qi often understood this "xing" as "life"—the innate endowment of man. The Zuo Zhuan (14th year of Duke Xiang), recording the words of the diviner Shi Kuang: "Heaven gave birth to the people and established rulers to oversee them, so they would not lose their nature (shi si xing)." Here, "xing" also refers to innate nature.

II. The Analects (Book 17, 2nd chapter), Confucius said: "By nature, men are nearly alike; by practice, they get to be wide apart." Here, "xing" is contrasted with "Xi" (practice/habit)—"Xing" is the state before external influence; "Xi" is the state formed by external influence. Confucius only said they are "nearly alike," not explicitly stating whether nature is good or evil, leaving a vast space for interpretation.

III. In the debates between Mencius and Gaozi in Mencius (Gaozi II), the concept of "xing" received its fullest discussion:

Gaozi said: "What is bestowed at birth is nature" (Sheng zhi wei xing). —Defining "xing" by "birth" (physiological instinct).

Mencius rebutted: "If what is bestowed at birth is nature, is whiteness the nature of white things$56" —If everything "given at birth" is called nature, how is human nature different from dog nature or ox nature$57

Gaozi said: "Eating and sexuality are nature" (Shi se, xing ye). —Defining human nature by appetite and sexual desire.

Mencius’s response: Human nature is different from the nature of dogs and oxen; human nature lies in benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, not merely in eating and sex.

The crucial issue here is: What precisely is "Xing"$58 Is everything innate called nature, or only that unique endowment that distinguishes humans from beasts$59 Mencius’s stance is clear: only those unique endowments that distinguish humans from beasts—the sprouts of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom—constitute true "human nature." Physiological instincts like eating and sexuality are innate, but they are shared with beasts, and thus not the crucial element defining humanity.

Returning to the "Wood of Ox Mountain" chapter: "Is this the nature of the mountain$60" What is the "nature" of the mountain$61 It is "once luxuriant" (chang mei)—the capacity to grow dense wood. Barrenness is not the nature of the mountain, just as not-goodness is not the nature of man. The nature of the mountain is "beauty" (mei), the nature of man is "goodness" (shan). External harm can make the mountain barren and man ungood, but it cannot change the mountain's nature or man's nature.

IV. The Zuo Zhuan (25th year of Duke Zhao) records the words of Zidashu of Zheng: "Propriety (li) is the constant principle of Heaven, the righteousness of Earth, and the conduct of the people." It also says: "People possess liking and disliking, joy and anger, sorrow and happiness, born from the Six Qi. Therefore, when examined, they align with their categories, which restrains the Six Desires." Here, human emotions (likes, dislikes, joy, anger, sorrow, happiness) are attributed to the "Six Qi," belonging to the natural endowment of heaven and earth. However, this concept of the "Six Qi" or Six Desires differs from what Mencius calls "Nature"—Mencius’s nature emphasizes the sprouts of goodness (benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom), rather than the range of emotions (likes, dislikes, joy, anger).

V. The Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong): "What Heaven imparts is called Nature (xing), following this nature is called the Way (dao), cultivating the Way is called education (jiao)." "Xing" originates from "Heaven’s impartment" (Tianming), and the "Way" originates from "following Nature" (shuai xing). The proposition "What Heaven imparts is called Nature" not only provides the ultimate explanation for the source of nature—nature comes from Heaven’s impartment—but also provides the metaphysical basis for the doctrine of inherent goodness—what Heaven imparts must be good, thus nature is also good.

In the "Wood of Ox Mountain" chapter, Mencius uses the "nature of the mountain" as a starting point to discuss "human nature," a line of reasoning consistent with the Zhongyong: The nature of the mountain is divinely endowed (the mountain inherently has the capacity to grow trees, this is not conferred by man); human nature is also divinely endowed (humans inherently possess the sprouts of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, these are not learned). External harm can obscure innate nature, but cannot destroy it.

Section 5.3 Comparative Analysis of "Nature" in Pre-Qin Schools

To further understand Mencius’s concept of "Xing," it is necessary to compare it with the views of other pre-Qin thinkers.

(A) Confucius: Nature is nearly alike, practice makes them far apart.

As mentioned, Confucius only said "By nature, men are nearly alike; by practice, they get to be wide apart" (Lunyu, Yang Huo), without explicitly classifying nature as good or evil. However, Confucius's thought contains abundant hints of inherent goodness:

The Analects (Book 4, 15th chapter) records:

The Master said: "I have never seen one who loves goodness (ren) as much as one who hates wickedness (bu ren). One who loves goodness can receive no higher praise; one who hates wickedness, if he were to practice goodness, would not allow wickedness to befall himself. Has anyone been able to exert himself for goodness for a single day$62 I have never seen one whose strength was insufficient. Perhaps there are such people, but I have not seen them."

Here, Confucius says, "I have never seen one whose strength was insufficient" to strive for goodness—implying everyone possesses the capacity to act benevolently. This capacity is innate, pre-existing—is this not the precursor to the doctrine of inherent goodness$63

The Analects (Book 7, 21st chapter) states:

The Master said: "Is Benevolence (ren) far away$64 If I wish for Benevolence, it arrives immediately."

Benevolence is not external; it arrives as soon as one desires it. This implies Benevolence is inherent, not something acquired externally.

(B) Gaozi: Nature is neither good nor not-good.

Gaozi was Mencius's primary debating opponent. Gaozi’s core assertion was "Xing wu shan wu bu shan"—human nature is neutral, capable of becoming good or not-good, depending entirely on later guidance. Gaozi’s metaphors:

"Nature is like the willow (qiyiu)"—Human nature is like willow wood, which can be made into any shape of vessel; in itself, it is neither good nor not-good.

"Nature is like a rushing stream (tuan shui)"—Nature is like a swift current, which can flow east or west; in itself, it is neither good nor not-good.

"What is bestowed at birth is nature" (Sheng zhi wei xing)—Everything innate is called nature, including instincts like eating and sex.

Gaozi’s line of reasoning represents a "blank slate" theory—human nature is a blank sheet upon which good or evil is written later. The problem with this view: If nature is truly neutral, where does the standard for good and evil come from$65 If there are no seeds of goodness within nature, where can goodness grow$66 If human nature has no innate tendency toward good, why does a person experience "alarm and compassion" (chu ti ce yin) upon seeing a child about to fall into a well$67

(C) Views of Shi Shuo and Mi Buqi: Nature Contains Both Good and Evil

Zhao Qi, commenting on Mencius, mentioned: "In the past, Shi Shuo of Zhou believed that human nature contained both good and evil. If the good nature is nourished and brought forth, goodness flourishes; if the evil nature is nourished and brought forth, evil flourishes." He also mentioned the differing views of Mi Buqi, Qi Diao Kai, and Gongsun Nizi regarding human nature. This view posits that human nature contains both good and evil components, and which one prevails depends on later cultivation. While this seems moderate, it faces a theoretical difficulty: If good and evil coexist within nature, what is their relationship$68 Are they equal or unequal$69 Are they of the same source or different sources$70 This view failed to answer these fundamental questions.

(D) Xunzi: Nature is Evil (Xing E)

The Xunzi (Xing E chapter) states:

"Human nature is evil; its goodness is acquired artificiality (wei). Now, human nature, being born, has a propensity for seeking gain; if one follows this, contention and usurpation arise, and yielding and propriety vanish. Being born, they have malice and dislike; if one follows this, cruelty and villainy arise, and loyalty and trustworthiness vanish. Being born, they have the desires of the eyes and ears, and a fondness for beautiful sounds and sights; if one follows this, licentiousness and disorder arise, and rites and refinement vanish. Thus, if one follows human nature and complies with human desires, they will inevitably resort to contention, violate distinctions and destroy order, and end in tyranny. Therefore, there must be the transformation of teachers' laws and the Way of Rites and Righteousness, before one can emerge into yielding and propriety, align with refinement and order, and end in governance. Judging by this, human nature is clearly evil, and its goodness is artificiality."

Xunzi's doctrine of "innate evil" forms the opposing pillar to Mencius's doctrine of "innate goodness" in pre-Qin human nature theory. Xunzi believed that human nature is to be fond of profit, malicious, and lustful; if one follows these innate tendencies, tyranny and disorder are inevitable—therefore nature is "evil." Goodness (yielding, trustworthiness, rites, and refinement) is not inherent but acquired through "artificiality" (wei)—the transformation of teachers’ laws and the Way of Rites and Righteousness.

Why did these two great Confucian scholars arrive at such opposing judgments on human nature$71 The key lies in their differing definitions of "Xing." What Mencius calls "Xing" refers to the unique endowment that makes man human—the sprouts of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. What Xunzi calls "Xing" refers to the natural desires inherent in man from birth—the propensity for gain, malice, and lust. They were discussing different aspects of "Xing." If natural desires are defined as nature, then nature can be called "evil" (because following natural desires leads to evil results); if moral endowment is defined as nature, then nature can be called "good" (because man inherently possesses the capacity to perceive morality).

In the "Wood of Ox Mountain" chapter, Mencius implicitly responds to the views akin to Xunzi’s (though Xunzi’s school crystallized slightly later, similar ideas existed in Mencius’s time). Mencius uses the analogy of Ox Mountain wood to illustrate: the mountain's "un-beautiful" state (barrenness) is not its "true nature," but the result of external harm. Likewise, human un-goodness is not human nature, but the result of erosion by material desires. If someone concludes human nature is inherently evil upon seeing human un-goodness, they commit the same error as "assuming there was never any timber"—deducing nature from result while ignoring the process that led to the result.

(E) Laozi and Zhuangzi: Nature Transcends Good and Evil

The Laozi, Chapter 5, states:

"Heaven and Earth are not benevolent; they treat the myriad things as straw dogs. The sage is not benevolent; he treats the people as straw dogs."

The Laozi, Chapter 18, states:

"When the Great Dao is abandoned, there arise benevolence and righteousness. When wisdom appears, there arise great deceits. When the six relationships are not in harmony, there arise filial piety and compassion. When the state is in chaos, there arise loyal ministers."

The Laozi, Chapter 38, states:

"Therefore, when the Dao is lost, virtue remains; when virtue is lost, benevolence remains; when benevolence is lost, righteousness remains; when righteousness is lost, propriety remains. Propriety is the thinning of loyalty and trustworthiness, and the beginning of chaos."

Laozi’s stance is that moral categories like benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are themselves products of the decay of the Dao. The true "Dao" transcends the distinction between good and evil. Therefore, Laozi would not agree with Mencius's definition of human nature in terms of benevolence and righteousness—in Laozi’s view, benevolence and righteousness are not the spontaneity of "Xing."

The Zhuangzi, Chapter on "Clenched Thumbs" (Pianmu), states:

"Thus, those who are proficient in brightness mix up the five colors and indulge in intricate patterns; are these not the dazzling splendor of blue, yellow, embroidered cloth, and brocade$72 It is precisely the likes of Lì Jù who pursue this. Those who are abundant in hearing mix up the five sounds and indulge in the six tones; are these not the sounds of metal, stone, silk, and bamboo, of the great Zhong and Huang modes$73 It is precisely the likes of Master Kuang who pursue this. Those who branch out in benevolence pull up virtue to block nature in order to gain fame and reputation, making the world chatter in admiration of inadequate laws; are these not the likes of Zeng Shen and Shi Yu who pursue this$74"

Zhuangzi suggests that benevolence and righteousness, in relation to human nature, are like a cloven thumb relative to a hand—they are superfluous and unnatural. The "benevolence" of Zeng Shen and Shi Yu, in Zhuangzi's view, is the result of "pulling up virtue to block nature" (zhuo de sai xing).

However, does Zhuangzi's criticism apply to Mencius$1 It is important to note that Mencius’s doctrine of inherent goodness emphasizes that benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not acquired norms, but innate moral intuitions. Mencius’s "benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom" are not artificial constructs (wei), but divinely endowed nature (xing). This is fundamentally different from the "branching out in benevolence" that Zhuangzi criticizes—the external addition of rites and righteousness. Mencius might argue: The benevolence and righteousness Zhuangzi criticizes are indeed external and artificial; those are not true benevolence and righteousness. True benevolence and righteousness are internal and innate, they are the "nature" (xing) itself.