An In-depth Interpretation of Mencius' 'The Trees of Ox Mountain' Chapter: The Core of Innate Goodness and Cultivation of Mind and Nature
This paper takes the "The Trees of Ox Mountain" chapter from Mencius' "Gaozi" as its core text, integrating it with pre-Qin philosophical literature to deeply analyze the argumentative structure of innate human goodness, the mechanisms by which external environments harm the mind and nature, and the philosophical foundations and cultivation practices of the theory of innate goodness.

Chapter 20: The Fundamental Difficulty of the Doctrine of Inherent Goodness and Mencius’s Response
Section 20.1 The Most Fundamental Question: If Nature is Good, Where Does Evil Come From$1
The greatest theoretical challenge facing the doctrine of inherent goodness is: "If human nature is inherently good, why is there so much evil in the world$2"
This question can be more precisely stated: If goodness is the original nature of man, then evil is a non-original, external phenomenon. But where does the "external" come from$3 If the external environment (society, material desire) is the source of evil, where does the evil in that external environment come from—is it not also created by man$4 If the men who create the evil environment are also inherently good, why do they create an evil environment$5
This is the circular dilemma of the "Origin of Evil": Good Nature → Man ought to do good → But man actually creates an evil environment → The evil environment causes man to lose his goodness → Man becomes ungood → The ungood man creates an even more evil environment... In this cycle, where did the initial "evil" begin$6
Section 20.2 Mencius’s Response: "Slightness" (Ji Xi) and the "Organs of Sight and Hearing"
Mencius does not directly answer the question of the "Origin of Evil" (which may be a limitation of pre-Qin thought), but his ideas contain an implicit response.
First, "The difference between man and beast is slight" (Ren zhi suo yi yi yu qin shou zhe ji xi)—The difference between man and beast is originally small. This "slightness" implies: although man has an innate nature of goodness, this goodness constitutes only a small proportion of man's total endowment. The majority of human endowments—appetites for food, sexual desire, instincts for self-preservation—are shared with beasts. Although these shared endowments are not "evil," if unchecked, they will erode that "slight" spark of goodness.
In other words, the origin of evil is not that human nature contains an element of "evil," but that the element of "good" within human nature is too weak—the sprouts of goodness are like newly sprouted shoots, while desires are like fully grown cattle and sheep. New shoots naturally cannot withstand the grazing of cattle and sheep.
Second, "The organs of sight and hearing do not think, but are obscured by things" (Er mu zhi guan bu si, er bi yu wu). The sense organs are passive—when external things arrive, the senses are attracted. This passivity causes people to pursue external things without consciously directing their inner conscience. Evil does not "arise" from some source of evil; rather, it is "formed" in the process of goodness being obscured—analogous to darkness not being a substance, but the state resulting from the obscuring of light.
Third, the chapter itself is a response—evil is the product of a "process," not "original nature." The barrenness of the mountain is not because the mountain’s nature is ugly, but because it was cut down and grazed. Likewise, human un-goodness is not because nature is ungood, but because of the process of erosion by material desires. Evil does not require a metaphysical origin (like an "evil nature"); it only requires an experiential process (external temptation → sensory pursuit → obscuring of conscience → arising of unrighteous action).
Section 20.3 Responses from Other Pre-Qin Thinkers to the "Origin of Evil"
(A) Xunzi’s Response
Xunzi (Xing E): "Now, human nature, being born, has a propensity for seeking gain; if one follows this, contention and usurpation arise, and yielding and propriety vanish."
Xunzi’s response is direct: Evil comes from natural human desires (fondness for gain, malice, lust). If one follows these natural desires (without the restraint of rites and righteousness), contention and disorder are inevitable.
However, Xunzi's response faces another difficulty: If nature is inherently evil, where does goodness come from$7 Xunzi says, "Its goodness is artificiality" (Qi shan zhe wei ye)—goodness comes from subsequent artificial construction (rites and education). But who created the rites and education$8 Xunzi says the Sages created them. But if the Sages are also inherently evil, how could they create good rites and righteousness$9 Xunzi’s answer is: "The Sages transform nature and establish artificiality; when artificiality is established, rites and righteousness arise." But "transforming nature" itself requires a power that transcends nature—where does this power come from$10 Xunzi failed to fully answer this question.
(B) Laozi’s Response
Laozi, Chapter 18: "When the Great Dao is abandoned, there arise benevolence and righteousness."
Laozi’s response is: Evil arises from the deviation from the Dao. When the world aligns with the Dao, there is no distinction between good and evil; when the world deviates from the Dao, the distinction between good and evil appears. The reason for deviating from the Dao is the growth of human cleverness and desire.
However, if the "Dao" is perfect and self-sufficient, why would it be deviated from$11 If the deviation comes from human cleverness and desire, where do cleverness and desire come from—are they not also products of the Dao$12 Laozi also failed to fully answer this question.
(C) Comparative Analysis
These three responses have their strengths and weaknesses:
Mencius’s response (Evil is the processual product of goodness being obscured) best preserves the primordial status of goodness but cannot fully explain how the "process of obscuring" initially began.
Xunzi’s response (Evil comes from natural desire) best conforms to common sense experience, but he cannot explain the ultimate source of "Goodness" (rites and righteousness).
Laozi’s response (Evil comes from the deviation of the Dao) possesses the deepest metaphysical insight, but he fails to explain why deviation occurs.
From the perspective of the "Wood of Ox Mountain" chapter, Mencius’s response, though imperfect, has the most practical guidance: Regardless of how evil originated, the key is how to "obtain nurture"—to restore the nature of goodness and nurture the conscience. Just as a doctor does not need to know how disease originated in human history, they only need to know how to treat the patient at hand. Mencius's concern is practical, immediate, and focused on the effort of cultivation.