A Deep Exploration of the Way of Sovereign and Minister in 'The Analects: Xian Wen' and the Contingency of Benevolence and Righteousness
This paper focuses on the core political discourse passages in 'The Analects: Xian Wen' concerning figures like Zang Wuzhong, Guan Zhong, and Duke Ling of Wei. It analyzes Confucius's profound insights into the sovereign-minister relationship, the distinction between hegemony and true kingship, and the calibration of benevolence (Ren) and righteousness (Yi), particularly investigating the gap between 'the difficulty of action' and 'the essence of Ren'.

Chapter 3: The Dispute over Trickery and Uprightness – The Hegemonic Character of Duke Huan of Qi and Duke Wen of Jin
Section 1: Original Passage and Interpretation
The Master said: "Duke Wen of Jin was tricky yet not upright; Duke Huan of Qi was upright yet not tricky." (晋文公谲而不正,齐桓公正而不谲。)
This passage is extremely concise yet embodies the Master’s overall assessment of the two great hegemons of the Spring and Autumn period. "Jue" (谲) means cunning or deceptive; "Zheng" (正) means open and upright. Duke Wen of Jin was tricky yet not upright; Duke Huan of Qi was upright yet not tricky.
At first glance, this appears to be a simple contrast, but upon closer examination, almost every character requires careful elucidation.
Section 2: Why Was Duke Huan of Qi Called "Upright" (Zheng)$30
Duke Huan of Qi (Gongzi Xiaobai), of the Jiang surname, Lu clan, named Xiaobai. His accession process was not entirely "upright"—he contended for the throne with Gongzi Jiu; Master Guan Zhong once shot him with an arrow on behalf of Gongzi Jiu (the arrow struck his belt hook, but he survived). Afterwards, he rushed back to Qi to claim the throne and compelled Lu to execute Gongzi Jiu. It cannot be said that power politics played no role in this process.
So, why did the Master still call him "Upright" (Zheng)$31
This requires an examination of Duke Huan’s hegemonic career after taking the throne.
Zuo Zhuan, 4th Year of Duke Xi, records that Duke Huan led the lords to attack Chu. The Chu envoy asked: "Your Lord resides in the Northern Sea, and our ruler in the Southern Sea; our horses and cattle do not touch. We never expected Your Lord to cross into our lands; for what reason$32" Master Guan Zhong replied: "In the past, Duke Kang of Lu commanded our former ruler, the Great Duke, saying: 'You shall lead the Five Lords and Nine Barons to jointly support the Zhou house.' He granted our former ruler land extending East to the Sea, West to the River, South to Muling, and North to Wudi. Now, your tribute of Baomao (a grass used for filtering sacrificial wine) does not arrive, and you do not provide the required materials for the King’s sacrifices, thus preventing the proper making of wine. It is for this that I attack you. King Zhao journeyed south and never returned; it is for this that I inquire."
This dialogue is crucial. What was the stated reason for Qi’s attack on Chu$33 It was the need to "Honor the King and expel the barbarians" (Zun Wang Rang Yi)—Chu failed to present the Baomao tribute to the Son of Heaven, hindering the proper performance of royal sacrifices. Furthermore, Qi inquired about the fate of King Zhao, who perished on a southern expedition against the south.
These two justifications were made under the banner of "supporting the Son of Heaven." Duke Huan’s attack on Chu was not for his private gain, but to maintain the authority of the Son of Heaven—at least nominally.
Zuo Zhuan, 9th Year of Duke Xi, records the Alliance of Kuaiqiu, presided over by Duke Huan. The alliance terms included: "All those who join this alliance shall reconcile their disputes after the oath" (凡我同盟之人,既盟之后,言归于好). It also records the oath: "Do not dam springs, do not hoard foodstuffs, do not exchange the trees of others, do not take a concubine as a wife, and do not let women interfere in state affairs" (毋壅泉,毋讫籴,毋易树子,毋以妾为妻,毋使妇人与国事). These stipulations were all about maintaining peace and the patriarchal social order among the feudal lords.
Guoyu, Qi Yu records the strategy of Master Guan Zhong assisting Duke Huan: "The four classes of people should not be mixed; if mixed, their words become chaotic, and their affairs disordered." "Integrate their states and organize their peripheries," "Establish internal administration and delegate military command." This was a complete and systematic governance structure.
Considering this historical evidence, we can discern the aspects in which Duke Huan’s actions were "Upright" (Zheng):
First, the banner of "Honoring the King and Expelling the Barbarians" was open and above board. He rallied the lords under the pretext of upholding the Son of Heaven's authority and resisting incursions by the Di (northern barbarians) and Chu (southern barbarians)—this was "Great Righteousness" (Da Yi).
Second, his diplomatic methods were transparent. He coordinated relations among the lords through alliances rather than through schemes and stratagems to divide and conquer.
Third, his governance strategy was institutionalized and systematic. Guan Zhong’s reforms were not temporary expedients but the construction of a sustainable system.
Fourth, in achieving the "Nine Summits of the Lords" (Jiu He Zhuhou), he did not rely on chariots of war. This point is emphasized in later passages—Duke Huan convened the lords nine times (the number nine signifying plurality), mostly through moral persuasion and diplomatic negotiation, rather than through military conquest. This was exceedingly rare in the Spring and Autumn period.
Mencius, Gongsun Chou I, quotes Mencius as saying: "The Five Hegemons were sinners against the Three Kings; today’s feudal lords are sinners against the Five Hegemons" (五霸者,三王之罪人也;今之诸侯,五霸之罪人也). Although Mencius generally criticized the Five Hegemons, even within this critique, Duke Huan of Qi was considered the most justifiable among them. This aligns with the Master’s judgment.
Section 3: Why Was Duke Wen of Jin Called "Tricky" (Jue)$34
Duke Wen of Jin (Chong’er), of the Ji surname, named Chong’er, had an extremely tortuous life—wandering in exile for nineteen years through hardships, finally returning to the throne with the aid of Qin.
The classic instance where he is called "Jue" is the Battle of Chengpu.
Zuo Zhuan, 28th Year of Duke Xi, details the entire battle. The most famous episode is the "Retreat of Three She" (a she being about 45 li). When Chong’er was in exile, he was treated courteously by King Cheng of Chu, and he promised: "When Jin and Chu meet in the Central Plains to fight, I will retreat three she for Your Majesty." Later, when the Battle of Chengpu occurred, the Jin army indeed retreated ninety li.
On the surface, this appears to be an act of "sincerity" (Xin)—he fulfilled his past promise. But from a military perspective, retreating three she was actually a tactic to lure the enemy deeper into the territory, allowing for a counterattack from a favorable position.
More crucially, it was the diplomatic maneuver following the victory at Chengpu. Zuo Zhuan, 28th Year of Duke Xi, records: "On the Guihai day, Prince Hu summoned the feudal lords to the King’s court, and the covenant stated: 'All shall support the royal house and harm no one. Should anyone violate this covenant, may the bright spirits destroy their army, and may their state never prosper, nor their descendants live to old age.'" (皆奖王室,无相害也。有渝此盟,明神殛之,俾队其师,无克祚国,及而玄孙,无有老幼。) —After defeating Chu, Duke Wen summoned the Son of Heaven to the "Covenant of Jian Tu."
This is the crux of the issue: He summoned the Son of Heaven.
In Zhou ritual law, the Son of Heaven should never be "summoned" by a feudal lord. The Spring and Autumn Annals records this event as: "The Heavenly King hunted at Heyang" (天王狩于河阳)—using the pretext of the "Son of Heaven going on a hunt" to conceal the fact that the Son of Heaven had been summoned to the meeting site. Zuo Zhuan directly states: "At this assembly, the Lord of Jin summoned the King, presented the lords to him, and moreover arranged for the King to hunt. Confucius said: 'To summon the ruler as a minister is not a precedent to be followed; hence the text says the Heavenly King hunted at Heyang.'" (Zuo Zhuan).
The Master’s own critique lies here—"To summon the ruler as a minister is not a precedent to be followed" (以臣召君,不可以训). This is the clearest manifestation of "tricky yet not upright":
- He claimed to honor the King, but he used the Son of Heaven as a tool to establish his hegemony.
- He claimed to fulfill his promise by retreating three she, but the retreat itself was a military stratagem.
- He claimed to maintain feudal order, but he established his hegemony by controlling the Son of Heaven.
Every step, nominally "upright," was executed through methods that were "tricky"—using the Son of Heaven for personal gain, luring the enemy deep into the territory, and establishing hegemony through war. This is "tricky yet not upright."
Section 4: The Political Philosophy of "Trickery" (Jue) and "Uprightness" (Zheng)
Why did the Master contrast "Jue" and "Zheng"$35 This is not merely a historical assessment of two figures but a differentiation between two fundamental political strategies.
The Politics of "Zheng" is a politics of inner and outer consistency. Your means must match your ends. If you claim to uphold world order, your method of action must itself be orderly and conform to ritual. Although Duke Huan’s hegemony involved calculations of power, his general direction was "Honoring the King and Expelling the Barbarians," and it was achieved primarily through alliances (diplomacy) rather than war.
The Politics of "Jue" is a politics where ends and means are bifurcated. What you say is one thing, what you do is another. You use the name of uprightness to achieve tricky ends. While Duke Wen’s hegemony also aimed at maintaining feudal order, his means were filled with stratagems and cunning.
These two political lines found more systematic theoretical expression in later Pre-Qin thought.
Xunzi, Wang Ba records Xunzi’s discourse: "When righteousness is established, kingship results; when sincerity is established, hegemony results; when cunning schemes are established, ruin results" (义立而王,信立而霸,权谋立而亡). Duke Huan, establishing hegemony through "sincerity" (Xin), roughly aligns with "hegemony results from sincerity"; Duke Wen, achieving hegemony through "trickery" (Jue), already approaches the category of "cunning schemes," though he had not yet reached "ruin," his political character was judged a grade lower.
Laozi, Chapter 17, states: "Of the best rulers, the people merely know they exist. Of the next best, the people love and praise them. Of the next, the people fear them. Of the worst, the people despise them... When sincerity is lacking, there is untrustworthiness" (信不足焉,有不信焉). The best ruler is one whose existence is barely noticed—implying the best ruler delegates affairs to the appropriate people and practices "non-action" (Wu Wei). Duke Wen’s "trickery" is precisely an instance of "lacking sincerity." Every declaration of "uprightness" on his part was neutralized by his own "tricky" actions. Over time, the lords stopped taking his "Honoring the King" banner seriously—because everyone saw that this so-called "Honoring the King" was merely a tool for hegemony.
Duke Huan’s "uprightness," while not entirely selfless (he was pursuing hegemony after all), maintained a high degree of consistency between "name" and "reality." This consistency itself carried immense moral resonance—it inspired the lords to follow him and brought security to the common people.
Section 5: Examining Duke Huan’s Hegemony Through the Ancient Concept of "Uprightness"
The character "Zheng" (Upright) has rich connotations in ancient culture.
Shuowen Jiezi states: "Zheng means 'correct.' It is composed of Zhi (止, stop/foot) and Yi (一, one)." Although this explanation is later, the oracle bone form of Zheng—composed of a square (city/state) and a foot (stepping/campaign)—already hints at its original meaning: Zheng means to march, to proceed straight toward a goal.
Shangshu, Hong Fan, records the words of Master Jizi: "Do not be partial or skewed, follow the righteousness of the King. Do not start by favoring or hating, follow the King's road. Without partiality or faction, the King’s Way is broad and level. Without faction or partiality, the King’s Way is even. Without turning back or leaning, the King’s Way is straight" (无偏无陂,遵王之义……王道正直). This is the highest political expression of "Zheng"—impartiality, openness, and straight-forwardness.
Duke Huan’s hegemony, while not fully reaching the height of "Kingship" (Wang Dao), certainly came closest to "Zheng" within the scope of "Hegemony" (Ba Dao). His "Honoring the King and Expelling the Barbarians" was justifiable; his "Nine Summits of the Lords" relied on virtue to persuade (at least outwardly); his governance was systematic and rule-based.
Duke Wen’s "trickery," on the other hand, makes us think of Yijing, Kan (Abyss) hexagram’s judgment: "Repeating the Abyss; if sincere, the heart will have success, and onward progress will be beneficial" (习坎,有孚,维心亨,行有尚). Kan is danger, entrapment. Duke Wen endured trials and dangers throughout his life, and these experiences forged his ability to survive in perilous situations—his capacity for "Jue." But "Jue" is a survival strategy necessary in peril; it should not become the norm for governance.
Yijing, Xici Zhuan II states: "All under Heaven share one destination but tread different paths; they share one goal but have a hundred ways of thinking" (天下同归而殊途,一致而百虑). The Dao of the world is interconnected, only the means of realization differ. Duke Huan chose the path of "Zheng," Duke Wen chose the path of "Jue." Both achieved hegemony, but the Master clearly felt that the path of "Zheng" was morally superior.
Section 6: The Impact of "Trickery" and "Uprightness" on Later Politics
We must ask: Why did the Master contrast Duke Huan and Duke Wen in this context$36
Examining the context, this chapter immediately follows the discussion of Zang Wuzhong's "coercing the ruler." Zang Wuzhong’s issue was "using strength to force the ruler"—this is a behavior of "Jue" rather than "Zheng." The logical progression is from an individual's "coercing the ruler" to a debate on the "trickery and uprightness" of hegemons.
Furthermore, the following chapter discusses the "Ren" of Master Guan Zhong—Guan Zhong was the right-hand man of Duke Huan. Therefore, the chapter "Duke Huan of Qi was upright yet not tricky" serves to lay the groundwork for assessing Master Guan Zhong’s "Ren": Only because Duke Huan’s hegemony was "Zheng" could Guan Zhong’s assistance be evaluated as "Ren"; had Duke Huan been "Jue like Duke Wen of Jin, Guan Zhong’s actions would have to be discounted.
Guanzi, Xing Shi states: "What the Dao speaks of is one thing, but how it is used varies. Some hear the Dao and like to serve one family; some hear the Dao and like to serve one village; some hear the Dao and like to serve one state; some hear the Dao and like to serve all under Heaven" (道之所言者一也,而用之者异……有闻道而好为天下者,天下之人也). Guan Zhong was great precisely because he was one who "liked to serve all under Heaven." And he could do this because Duke Huan’s "Zheng" provided him with the platform to display his talents.
If we push this logic further: Is the Master himself not someone who "likes to serve all under Heaven"$37 He traveled the states his entire life seeking a ruler who was "Zheng" to serve, but ultimately failed. Guan Zhong was fortunate enough to meet a ruler as "Zheng" as Duke Huan; Confucius was unfortunate to live in an age of "Jue," unable to find a worthy lord to serve.
This implication transforms the "Dispute over Trickery and Uprightness" from a mere historical evaluation into a reflection imbued with deep historical melancholy and personal feeling.